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SPEECHES
WHY MANDATORY MINIMUMS MAKE NO SENSEt
JOHN S. MARTIN, JR.*
It is a great pleasure to be here and to participate in this
Symposium on what I consider to be a very important topic. It is
particularly important today because there is a group of wild-
eyed liberals who are attempting to undermine effective law
enforcement in the United States by doing away with mandatory
minimum sentences. This group includes such well-known radi-
cals as William Rehnquist, Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer,
and all of the members of the Judicial Conference of the United
States.
The response of the Justice Department to the virtually
unanimous view of the federal judiciary that mandatory mini-
mum sentences make no sense is simply that judges resent the
fact that sentencing power is taken away from them. I know of
no judge who takes joy in exercising sentencing discretion in the
limited number of cases where it is now available. Indeed prior
to the sentencing guidelines, a number of judges expressed to
me a view that sentencing was the most difficult part of their job.
Today, the mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines in
many ways make the job of ajudge easier. In the vast majority of
cases, judges no longer have to take moral responsibility for the
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sentence they impose. They could look a defendant that they
have just sentenced thirty years in the eye and say, "Don't blame
me-I'm just a scorekeeper." Talk to the Congressmen who
voted for this mandatory minimum sentence.
The reason the judges are opposed to mandatory minimums
is not that they are power hungry but rather that they see on a
day-to-day basis the injustice that results from inflexibility in sen-
tencing, whether it be a result of mandatory minimums or the
result of a restriction ofjudicial discretion under the sentencing
guidelines.
In the limited time I have available this evening, let me place
before you some of the reasons judges oppose mandatory mini-
mums. First, the vast majority of responsible studies of
mandatory minimum sentences suggest they have almost no
value in deterring crime and that they result in gross injustice.
In a report issued in April 1990, a special committee
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States at the direc-
tion of Congress to make recommendations for improvements
on the federal courts, stated "Congress should repeal mandatory
minimum sentencing provisions whereupon the United States
Sentencing Commissions should reconsider the guidelines appli-
cable to the effected offenses." The Committee stated that
mandatory minimums "create penalties so distorted as to hamper
federal criminal adjudication."
A study by the Federal Judicial Center of the deterrent
impact of mandatory minimum drug laws concluded "the weight
of the evidence clearly shows that enactment of mandatory penal-
ties has either no demonstrable effect or short term effects that
rapidly waste away."
A study of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offend-
ers conducted by the Rand Corporation found that mandatory
minimum sentences were less cost effective than either conven-
tional law enforcement or drug treatment. The study concluded
that every million dollars spent on incarcerating drug offenders
for longer periods of time would result in the decrease of thir-
teen kilograms of cocaine distributed. However, if you took that
same million dollars and rather than spending it for prisons
guards and other correction costs, used it to put more police or
drug agents on the streets, it would reduce narcotics distribution
by twenty-seven kilograms. Even more revealing, the study found
that if you took the same million dollars and spent it treating
heavy users in narcotics addiction programs, it would reduce
cocaine consumption by over 100 kilograms. Unfortunately, it is
easier to run for Congress by saying you voted for harsher
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mandatory sentences for drug dealers than by saying you voted to
allocate more money for drug addiction programs.
Perhaps the most persuasive arguments against mandatory
minimum sentences are contained in the August 1991 Report to
Congress of the United States Sentencing Commission. This was
the commission that was chaired by the Honorable William W.
Wilkins. I had the privilege of serving under ChiefJudge Wilkins
when he was the Chair of the Criminal Law Committee of the
Judicial Conference. He is someone for whom I have great
respect, but his liberal credentials are far from impressive. He
was appointed by President Reagan as district and circuit judge
in South Carolina and served in his early career as a legislative
assistant to Strom Thurman of South Carolina.
Because the Sentencing Commission's Report makes the
case against mandatory minimums so persuasively, I hope you
will excuse me if I read to you some of its principal conclusions:
" There are over sixty criminal statutes that contain
mandatory minimum penalties applicable to federal
offenses in the federal criminal code today. Only four of
these sixty statutes, however, frequently result in convic-
tions; the four relate to drug and weapons offenses.
* Despite the expectation that mandatory minimum
sentences would be applied to all cases that meet the
statutory criteria of eligibility, the available data suggest
that this is not the case. This lack of uniform application
creates unwarranted disparity in sentencing, and com-
promises the potential for the guidelines sentencing sys-
tem to reduce disparity.
" In thirty-five percent of cases in which available data
strongly suggest that the defendant's behavior warrants a
sentence under a mandatory minimum statute, defend-
ants plead guilty to offenses carrying non-mandatory
minimum or reduced mandatory minimum provisions.
Since the charging and plea negotiation processes are
neither open to public review nor generally reviewable
by the courts, the honesty and truth in sentencing
intended by the guidelines system is compromised.
" The disparate application of mandatory minimum
sentences in cases in which available data strongly sug-
gest that a mandatory minimum is applicable appears to
be related to the race of the defendant, where whites are
more likely than non-whites to be sentenced below the
applicable mandatory minimum.
" Whereas the structure of the federal sentencing guide-
lines differentiates defendants convicted of the same
2004]
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offense by a variety of aggravating and mitigating facts,
the consideration of which is meant to provide just pun-
ishment and proportional sentences, the structure of
mandatory minimums lacks these distinguishing charac-
teristics. Under the guidelines, offenders classified as
similar receive similar sentences; under mandatory mini-
mums, offenders seemingly not similar nonetheless
receive similar sentences. It thus appears that an unin-
tended effect of mandatory minimums is unwarranted
sentencing uniformity.
" Deterrence, a primary goal of the Sentencing Reform
Act and the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, is
dependent on certainty and appropriate severity. While
mandatory minimum sentences may increase severity,
the data suggest that uneven application may dramati-
cally reduce certainty. The consequence of this bifur-
cated pattern is likely to thwart the deterrent value of
mandatory minimums.
" Since the power to determine the charge of conviction
rests exclusively with the prosecution for the eighty-five
percent of the cases that do not proceed to trial,
mandatory minimums transfer sentencing power from
the court to the prosecution.
" The sentencing guidelines system is essentially a system
of finely calibrated sentences. For example, as the quan-
tity of drugs increases, there is a proportional increase in
the sentence. In marked contrast, the mandatory mini-
mums are essentially a flat, tariff-like approach to sen-
tencing. Whereas guidelines seek a smooth continuum,
mandatory minimums result in "cliffs." The "cliffs" that
result from mandatory minimums compromise propor-
tionality, a fundamental premise for just punishment,
and a primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act.
Let me turn to the impact of mandatory minimum sentences
on the administration of justice. The mandatory minimum
sentences for drugs and weapon use are themselves extremely
harsh. They also impact the overall severity of the sentencing
guidelines because the United States Sentencing Commission
has determined that in setting the guidelines for these offenses,
they should make them consistent with the mandatory mini-
mums. This has the effect of raising all of the drug and weapons
offenses to the same level of severity as the mandatory mini-
mums. There is a more subtle impact on the other sentences
because once you have such severe sentences for narcotics, there
is a tendency to increase the sentences in white collar cases to
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avoid the perception that a double standard is being applied.
Thus, we can proudly say we now treat white collar defendants
almost as unfairly as we treat narcotics defendants.
This combination of harsh mandatory minimums and their
impact on the sentencing guidelines has had a dramatic impact
on the rate at which we are imprisoning people in the federal
system. In 1986, the year before the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines became effective, there were 37,542 people in federal pris-
ons. Of the defendants who went to prison that year, 16%
received prison sentences of five years or more. Today there are
173,000 people in federal prison and, approximately 70% of
them are serving sentences of more than five years, 17% are serv-
ing sentences of more than fifteen years and 12% are serving
more than twenty years. What makes these numbers particularly
striking is that only 3% of those federal prisoners are incarcer-
ated on charges of aggravated assault, homicide, or kidnap-
ping-crimes that we might think can justify such severe
sentences.
Does anyone here believe that this vast increase in the num-
ber of our citizens serving sentences of five years or more in fed-
eral custody has made us safer? Has it decreased drug use? I
suggest the answer is no.
While these statistics are frightening, the absurdity of
mandatory minimum sentencing is easier to see in the context of
particular cases. Let me briefly describe two such cases that I
had. About a year ago, I was presiding at a pretrial conference in
a criminal case. I asked the Assistant U.S. Attorney to outline the
proof against the defendant. He said this defendant, who was an
addict, sat on a stoop on a public street and when people would
come up and ask where they could get crack, he would tell them
of the apartment in which the other defendants were selling
crack. Because he did this, from time to time the crack dealers
would give him some crack for his own use. I asked what the
guideline sentence was. The answer was that because the defen-
dant had prior convictions for street level sales of drugs there was
a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years.
Let me give you another example. One of the early cases I
tried involved a single mother of two children who worked at the
United States Post Office in downtown Manhattan on the night
shift. At approximately 11:30 one night, she had her break and
went to a local bar where she joined two other women from the
post office waiting to buy some cocaine for their personal use.
When the cocaine dealer came in, and they each said that they
wanted a twenty dollar bag, he asked one of them to step outside
with him to exchange the money for the cocaine, and the defen-
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dant volunteered to do this. She was found guilty of distributing
cocaine within a thousand feet of a school, which carried a
mandatory one-year prison sentence. When I received her pre-
sentence report it revealed that the drug dealer who sold her the
cocaine received a sentence of probation because he cooperated
with the prosecution.
Another example of the irrationality of mandatory mini-
mums is found in a recent order in the case of Weldon Angelos
entered by Judge Paul G. Cassell, a DistrictJudge in Utah, a con-
servative Republican appointed in 2001 by President Bush. Wel-
don, a 24-year-old dealer in marijuana had a guidelines range of
6.5 years. However, because Angelos carried a gun that was
never displayed during two of his marijuana deals and had a shot-
gun in his apartment he is facing mandatory sentences of fifty-
five years that must be consecutive to his six year guideline sen-
tence. Faced with this sixty-one year sentence, Judge Cassell
asked the parties to brief a series of questions relating to the con-
stitutionality of the mandated sentence, including whether the
mandatory minimum sentences violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of irrational classifi-
cations when compared to the following sentences under the
guidelines for far more serious crimes:
* Mr. Angelos will apparently serve a prison term of at
least 738 months.
" The kingpin of a major drug trafficking organization in
which death or serious bodily injury resulted from the
distribution of drugs will serve a prison term of no more
that 293 months.
* A terrorist who detonates a bomb in a public place
intending to kill a bystander will serve a prison term of
no more than 235 months.
" A racist who attacks a minority with the intent to kill and
inflicts permanent or life-threatening injuries will serve a
prison term of no more than 210 months.
* A spy who gathers top secret information that could be
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security will serve a prison term of no more
than 210 months.
* A second degree murderer will serve a prison term of no
more than 168 months.
* A marijuana dealer trafficking five kilograms of mari-juana shoots an innocent person during a drug transac-
tion will serve a prison term of no more than 153
months.
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I suggest that these comparisons clearly demonstrate the
absurd results that we get from mandatory minimums. Perhaps
this absurdity could be tolerated if mandatory minimums were
good law enforcement policy. However, they represent bad law
enforcement policy.
Our current sentencing scheme leads to inefficiency in the
war against drugs. We have gotten to the draconian sentences
which exist today because ever since I was an Assistant United
States Attorney in the early 1960s, drug enforcement officials
would tell Congress, "We can win the war on drugs if we increase
drug sentences." Time after time Congress would respond to
that argument by increasing the penalties. However, these harsh
penalties are applied without any thought about the level of
involvement of the particular defendant in the narcotics distribu-
tion scheme. When you fail to distinguish between major and
minor violators, you give the law enforcement community the
ability to brag about their success in prosecuting narcotics viola-
tors. They can testify before Congress and say, "Look, there are
30,000 people who are in federal prison for sentences of over ten
years because of their narcotics violations." What is not said is
that the incarceration of ninety-five percent of those individuals
will have no meaningful impact on the amount of drugs distrib-
uted because those individuals are low level members of narcot-
ics distribution organizations who can be immediately replaced
upon arrest.
It is very easy for drug enforcement officers to go out on the
street and arrest addicts selling drugs. But you end up with
somebody doing more than twenty years in jail who was immedi-
ately replaced by another addict willing to sell drugs to get some
for himself. Drug agents can create impressive statistics by arrest-
ing low level drug dealers. It takes a much greater law enforce-
ment effort to prosecute major violators who do not operate
openly on the streets. If we simply limited the harsh penalties to
major violators, we would be providing the Drug Enforcement
Agency with an incentive to concentrate their efforts on major
violators and we would have a way of measuring the success of law
enforcement in the war on drugs.
Let me conclude by summing up my views on mandatory
minimum sentences. They are cruel, unfair, a waste of resources,
and bad law enforcement policy. Other than that they are a
great idea.
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